SPACE+SPATIAL Industry Growth Roadmap | https://ssir-consult.cofluence.co Towards 2030 Sun, 06 Jun 2021 03:46:10 +0000 en-AU hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.5 Space as an operational domain for defence capability https://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/5-10/ Sun, 09 May 2021 12:29:08 +0000 http://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/?p=18836

Challenge

The July publication of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and Force Structure Plan (FSP) outlined a number of strategic challenges in the Space Domain. Australia’s growing security dependence on space and the increasing vulnerability of national security space capabilities create the need to rethink the scope and scale of Defence space capabilities. The FSP states the intent for sovereign space capabilities in both satellite communication and satellite imaging capabilities. As a result, there are now new opportunities for developing Australian industry content and sovereign capabilities for national defence and security. The FSP identified a number of capability investments in satellite communications, resilient PNT, space domain awareness and geospatial intelligence that represent out largest national investment in space and supporting systems. These are set out in Table 3:

OPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH

Table 3: Planning funding for space and spatial initiatives in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update

This funding represents a strong opportunity for Australia’s space industry to participate in the development and delivery of solutions that meet future national security needs.

  • The scale of this investment and the stated goals of the government related to Australian Industry impact a wide range of space and spatial technologies and systems. Australia needs to position its industrial sector to ensure these important future capabilities can be delivered, sustained and operated in an increasingly contested space environment.
  • The increased funding identified for acquisition and sustainment will require increased employment in a range as space and spatial disciplines related to operation of space systems and data systems supporting geospatial intelligence and space situational awareness.

ACTIONS

1. Identify critical Defence space capability elements that require a high degree of nationally based development, operation and sustainment and ensure these areas are recognised as priorities for R&D investment and workforce planning.

2. This could be undertaken by setting up a joint working party with industry associations comprising SIAA, SIBA-GITA, FrontierSI, SSSI and Defence representatives.

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Space & spatial governance arrangements, incl. disaster response https://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/5-08/ Sun, 09 May 2021 12:28:45 +0000 http://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/?p=18837

Challenge

Climate change is the great challenge our time. In Australia it is causing devasting fires on a scale never before seen with predictions of much worse to come. Other natural disasters are expected to increase in frequency and intensity including droughts, cyclones, extreme storms and massive coastal inundation putting lives, livelihoods, ecosystems and critical infrastructure at grave risk over the coming century. These are occurring over increasingly greater areas. The role of space and spatial systems in providing monitoring capabilities and supporting forecasting, planning, and recovery operations will be vital.

So what more can be done, that has not already been identified to deploy space and spatial capabilities to greater effect in the effort to deal with disasters?

OPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH

The Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements found that better national coordination in response to natural hazards is needed. A series of recommendations supporting better decision making involve data management as applied to spatial data.

“Australian, state and territory governments should explore the feasibility and practicalities of developing and maintaining nationally consistent assessments and projections of the frequency, intensity and spatial distribution of natural hazards in Australia.”

The source of much of this data is earth observation satellites owned and operated by non-Australian entities . Submissions from every state and territory as well as the Bureau of Meteorology, CSIRO and Emergency Management Australia stated that improved data capabilities from sensors, including satellite-based sensors, was required [page 116 of report].

The report noted that recommendations for nationally consistent data for disaster information has been a recurring theme in reviews and enquiries since at least 2002.

ACTIONS

The development of a nationally coordinated approach to the use of space and spatial capabilities is becoming an increasingly high priority.

1. Australia should consider the development and implementation of a national capability plan to exploit advanced satellite enabled communications and IoT connectivity technologies that augment current systems, especially through the ability to provide short notice emergency connectivity and the rapid restoration of medium-term communications during the response and recovery phases of a natural disaster.

2. Australia should consider investing in nationally coordinated and consistent approach to data management, data fusion and analytics systems with the objective of building the equivalent of an Australian Disaster Resiliency Digital Twin. This development could support the development of optimized and sovereign solutions to gaps in national capabilities for real- time data fusion and analytics. The outcome would be a national asset that supports more effective land management, planning, emergency response and recovery across the nation.

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National space sovereignty – needs and aspirations https://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/5-01/ Sun, 09 May 2021 12:24:39 +0000 http://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/?p=18777

Challenge

Growing regional strategic competition, global trade disputes, exposure to information operations seeking foreign influence in Australian businesses and institutions, cyber threats and the economic impact of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic have led to a renewed focus by the Australian government on sovereignty.

The space and spatial sector are fundamentally enabled by global supply chains dependent on international partnerships. Underpinning these supply chains is critical ICT infrastructure. There are two key questions in this regard; what level of assured access does Australia aspire to over the next decade and in which specific space and spatial technologies?

OPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH

Australia could strengthen and expand its national capabilities and capacity in areas that lead to increased resilience of critical infrastructure and national systems of importance. This growth could lead to greater development and exploitation of national intellectual property and contribute to national security outcomes.

Australia could also make stronger contributions (financial and in-kind) to selected international programs to guarantee access and create opportunities for local industry.

ACTIONS

1. Identify priority investment areas for Australian where self-reliance supports operation of critical infrastructure and national security.

2. Support selected international programs that create opportunities for alignment of national interests between Australia and like-minded nations, through activities including contributed intellectual property and work-share/supply chain.

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Priority data stores https://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/5-21/ Sun, 09 May 2021 12:02:09 +0000 http://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/?p=18804

Challenge

Australia possesses many significant data stores within government agencies and research organisations (eg GA’s DEA, the National Computational Infrastructure, jurisdictional agency systems, and NCRIS facilities to name a few) which have been created fit for a specific purpose. These have been or are in the process of being migrated to cloud environments, mostly owned and operated by multi-national private sector providers, some of which are located off-shore.The use of cloud infrastructures has increased exposure in terms of sovereignty, security, fragmentation, non-optimised critical mass, duplication, barriers to access, data currency, and the role of the private sector in public-private partnership. Optimising data storage and prioritising the custodianship and physical location offers the opportunity for improvement. It is timely to examine the risks to national spatial data stores, infrastructure, systems and analytics, including the physical location of the systems on-shore and off-shore.

Another key issue is to inventory data stores related to Critical infrastructure, ie. determine which of Australia’s data stores need to be afforded special protection status, with increased governance and security, and overseen by formal data policy (including access protocols etc).

There is also an opportunity, once defined, to look at icon examples to build and use other nationally enabling infrastructure. A good example is DEA, which has increasing government and private use within Australia, and is also well regarded globally as a leading example of open data cubes. There are other examples of coordinated data collections and data stores, such as the square kilometre array, which is a next-generation radio telescope and will yield data volumes of approximately 300 PB per telescope per year during full science operations, and the data will be produced at a rate of approximately 0.5–1TB per second.

And what of the potential to create and manage datastores on-board in space? Is this considered a priority?

OPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH

Perhaps one recent and highly relevant example which illustrates a number of the issues outlined above is in the use of information in relation to preparing and responding to bushfires. The National Natural Disaster Arrangements Royal Commission (Bushfires Royal Commission) made the following recommendations in their report, primarily within the chapter on supporting better decisions:

  • Rec 4.1: Australian, state and territory governments should prioritise the implementation of harmonised data governance and national data standards.
  • Rec 4.4: The National Disaster Risk Information Services Capability should include tools and systems to support operational and strategic decision making, including integrated climate and disaster risk scenarios tailored to the various needs of relevant industry sectors and end users.
  • Whilst not a recommendation, the reports states that “Australian, state and territory governments should explore the feasibility and practicalities of developing and maintaining nationally consistent:
    • Assessments of frequency, intensity and spatial distribution of natural hazards in Australia, and
    • Projections of the frequency, intensity and spatial distribution of natural hazards in Australia.”
  • The report also makes reference to GA’s Australian Exposure Information Platform (AEIP) as a tool to support decision makers understand state based exposure to natural hazards but notes that this tools does not currently provide information through a geospatial mapping layer. This tools and the underlying database, the National Exposure Information System (NEXIS), “.. should be maintained and improved”.
  • Rec 4.7: Australian, state and territory governments should continue to develop a greater capacity to collect and share standardised and comprehensive natural disaster impact data.

ACTIONS

1. An audit and prioritisation of critical data priority stores that underpin national decision making. One example is Bushfire response.

2. Development of secure data stores with appropriate collaborative infrastructures that facilitate data access, with appropriate privacy and ethics requirements. This should also encompass appropriate governance including legal mechanisms, regulation frameworks, and ethics guidelines which facilitate collaborations between government, universities and industry in relation to data ethics, transparency, autonomy, and replicability.

3. The importance of standards and common frameworks for collection, storage and delivery of spatial data and that appropriate metadata needs to be emphasised to underpin management and discovery of the data and for users to determine how the data can be used and reused.

4. Consideration should also be given to required private data stores as well as shared infrastructures driven by citizen contributions.

5. Coincident computational information processing capability will need to be developed in tandem with appropriate sharing frameworks that allow researchers to collaborate and innovate.

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Augmented-Assured-Australian (AAA) PNT https://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/5-20/ Sun, 09 May 2021 12:02:02 +0000 http://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/?p=18803

Challenge

The rapid and increasing uptake of PNT applications across multiple sectors of the Australian economy shows no sign of slowing, with PNT capabilities being integrated as an operational dependency for myriad applications, as well as critical infrastructure systems such as power utilities, financial services, mobile networks and transportation. Indeed, the augmentation of global constellations with regional systems such as SBAS has only led to greater reliance on PNT, as demonstrated by federal investment into GA’s Positioning Australia program.

Consequently, to capitalise on these demands for a PNT system which is accessible, accurate and available for all Australian sectors, a major challenge will be developing an indigenous capability that ensures PNT across the nation by improving its resilience, robustness and trustworthiness over the long-term.

OPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH

The importance of GNSS PNT capability to the success of Australia’s future has been noted previously, for example in the Australian Civil Space Strategy, where it was identified as a high priority area for growth and investment, and the Australia Academy of Science’s (AAS) 2017: A vision for space science and technology in Australia.

Positioning data derived from GNSS is considered by ANZLIC as one of Australia’s fundamental data sets, and the AAS has commissioned a new working group for PNT. These all build on previous work started in 2012 to develop the Australian Strategic Plan For GNSS, which proposed a strategic direction for Australia’s PNT that would lead to significant benefits including ‘enhanced productivity, job creation, industry growth, the identification of new export markets, increased competitiveness, improved workplace safety, enhanced national security, strengthened international linkages and a dynamic R&D sector’.

Accordingly, the 2012 Strategic Plan set-out four strategic initiatives:

(1) Ensure leadership for the Australian GNSS community;

(2) Adopt a whole-of-nation approach to a sustainable, multi-GNSS-enabled positioning infrastructure;

(3) Mitigate vulnerabilities in existing and future GNSS infrastructure; and

(4) Capitalise on Australia’s unique geopolitical and geographic advantages.

While there has been significant progress within Australia since 2021 towards achieving these four objectives, there is still considerable opportunity from harnessing the future economic, social and environmental impacts of PNT, especially given the evolution of PNT applications, advances in GNSS constellations and their visibility across Australia, therefore it is felt that the time is right to renew the Strategic Plan.

Innovating new capabilities

  • Developing a sovereign capability to monitor and assess both the state of error sources affecting GNSS (as will be realised through the Positioning Australia program) and its inherent integrity is critical not only for positioning and navigation but also for the multitude of applications requiring the timing component currently supplied by GNSS.
  • Delivering novel GNSS products that further contribute to our understanding of the dynamic atmosphere for weather forecasting, climatological studies, and the behaviour of the ionosphere and space weather. These products, such as GNSS derived models of atmospheric density, could afford greater resilience to our sovereign PNT capabilities. Additionally, the dynamic impacts of atmospheric effects on PNT are also experienced by other sectors within the growth pillars (Earth Observation, Satellite Communications and Space Domain Awareness (SDA)), so clear collaborative partnerships and knowledge exchange pathways are required to ensure that findings are benefitted across all industry sectors.
  • Developing products and services essential for ensuring assured GNSS information for mission-critical and safety-critical PNT applications such as automated industrial machines, robotics, driverless vehicles, aircraft and infrastructure dependent on timing. Inventing, developing and delivering Australia-specific critical PNT integrity messages especially ones pertaining to high accuracy PNT services (such as RTK and PPP), could later become an industry-leading innovation to export regionally and globally further raising Australia’s PNT reputation.

Improving infrastructure, mitigating vulnerabilities and assuring access

  • Development of assured PNT capabilities for Australia – meaning one that is suitably protected and secured (with authentication and possibly encryption) – to deliver the required PNT performances under adverse conditions. Assured PNT impacts all aspects of space (both downward and outward looking), and the growing spatial sector.
  • Cultivating resilience across our PNT capabilities to better protect against both unintentional and purposeful interference and spoofing across all segments, including but not limited to known incidents such as solar flares, cybersecurity breaches, erroneous almanac uploads and unlikely ‘black swan’ events.
  • Design and implementation of sub-metre (and even decimetre-level) accuracy GNSS systems based on low-cost mass-market GNSS receivers, enhanced via emerging terrestrial 5G telecommunications infrastructure delivering augmentation information for enhanced accuracy and integrity. Ideally, these GNSS products would be developed locally and be fully compatible with Australian PNT information and services.
  • Developing and facilitating the integration of space-borne GNSS receivers aboard Australian satellites to support more applications of small satellites for communications, earth observation and PNT, and even on missions beyond Earth orbit, for so-called space service volume navigation.
  •  Augmenting the GNSS space segment, for example using select LEO satellites equipped with appropriate payloads, could provide increased availability of the more advanced PNT techniques (RTK, network RTK, SSR and PPP-RTK). Indeed the provision of sovereign PNT integrity messages (determined for Australia by Australia) transmitted by Australian space infrastructure, must be complemented by simultaneous transmission through secondary terrestrial communications as a robust delivery method.
  • Collaborating across federal and state governments to incorporate PNT infrastructure (terrestrial and orbital) and generated services (corrections, integrity, interference) within the Critical Infrastructure Network as part of an ongoing Risk Assessment and Mitigation program.
  • Develop real-time capability to detect, measure, geolocate and ultimately mitigate sources of interference and spoofing to GNSS across Australia and realise it as a ‘Nationwide GNSS Interference Monitoring Infrastructure’. Such an infrastructure could be hosted and coordinated between federal government and Defence, and report incidents of interference alongside ongoing integrity messages to the wider community, further facilitating the adoption and trust in PNT for Australia, by Australians.
  • The successful augmentation of current GNSS with alternate (non-GNSS) PNT coming from emerging technologies promises even greater levels of resilience, robustness and trust around assured PNT for space and spatial sectors.

ACTIONS

Several fundamental activities such as SBAS and NPIC are already progressing under GA’s leadership of their Positioning Australia program; by leveraging these deliverables, opportunities exist for significant growth across industries and international borders, with several having potential global outreach/impact.

To capitalise on the numerous opportunities that PNT holds for Australia, a number of governance and policy recommendations are made to facilitate engagement and ensure adoption.

1. Developing an updated ‘GNSS Strategic Plan for Promoting Enhanced PNT Capabilities across Australia’ detailing industry strategy and aligned incentive mechanisms to facilitate development of high-tech GNSS-related products, services and workforce by local companies and organisations, which endeavour to adopt the new PNT capabilities that will become available across the nation. Leadership of this strategy development will require disciplined coordination across government, Defence, industry and education.

2. Forming a multi-industry group being responsible for monitoring, marketing and evangelising all strategic PNT plans developed and in action across Australia, and providing guidance where necessary, to provide consistency, ensure clarity and eliminate duplication through effective collaboration. Ideally, this could take the form of a ‘Strategic Coordination & Engagement Group’ or ‘Task Force’ comprising federal, academic and industry representatives, would be mandated to the new GNSS Strategic Plan, and be an official first point of contact for both Australian and international queries around the PNT innovations.

3. Sustained long-term investing in training and education, as well as research and innovation, to ensure that our industry sectors and workforce possess the capacity, competency and empowerment to take advantage of the opportunities offered by an assured, resilient and augmented PNT across Australia.

4. Mobilise the PNT ecosystem by boosting investments in the research, development, and commercialisation pathways for local companies and industry to create novel high-tech PNT products & services which complement and augment GNSS (connecting upstream space segments with the big primes through SBAS for example, with the downstream markets), ultimately creating new sectors and jobs. These innovations include new quantum sensors, terrestrial positioning systems, vision and imaging sensors, signals-of-opportunity, chip-scale atomic clocks, inertial measurement units and others, along with the sensor fusion engines required to successfully integrate all these measurements together with existing PNT. Mechanisms should also be created to leverage Defence’s funding, IP and developments around assured and resilient PNT, into the civilian consumer marketplace through appropriate fast-track commercialisation pathways. New service industries utilising PNT should be fostered and encouraged to promote nationally and export internationally.

5. Encouraging international collaboration with key partners on prospective plans for new PNT capabilities – both space- and ground-based. Strengthen Australia’s capability to understand, analyse and leverage strategic advantages and opportunities of partnering on emerging technologies.

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Resilient & extreme reliability connectivity for safety of life https://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/5-19/ Sun, 09 May 2021 12:01:55 +0000 http://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/?p=18802

Challenge

The Cospas-Sarsat system has been operational for almost 40 years providing a global distress system to support and enhance search and rescue operations. The service is provided through a treaty-based, intergovernmental organisation with 45 signatories. Australian representation is through the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) within the Department for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications. AMSA manages ground stations for the system in QLD and WA with a Mission Control Centre in the ACT.

The first-generation service was supported by a number of Low Earth Orbit satellites (LEOSAR) and geo-stationary satellites (GEOSAR) and supporting ground stations around the world. The second-generation system is currently deploying hosted payloads on a range of GNSS satellites in Medium Earth Orbit (MEOSAR) which will improve system performance, both in geo-location accuracy and latency of emergency beacon activation detection.

The Cospas-Sarsat systems uses a single 100kHz worldwide spectrum allocation at 406 MHz to support maritime, aviation and land-based search and rescue for safety of life.

Current limitations and issues with the current system include:

  • Low powered beacon (user segment) combined with current satellite design severely limits communications performance, particularly during an emergency. Very little useful information content can be exchanged during the emergency.
  • False alarms can result in unnecessary search and rescue operations that are expensive and high-risk to emergency and military personnel
  • Beacon life and reliability can be uncertain
  • Location accuracy can be poor – first generation systems provide a 1km CEP and second- generation systems offer 150m without access to GNSS. This inaccuracy limits applications
  • High cost – low production quantities and beacon design result in higher cost per unit limiting market potential.
  • Regional uptake is low – currently the USA and Australia represent the bulk of global ownership of beacons
  • No integration – the beacon design limits the ability for value-added integration with contemporary personal devices such as smart watches, smart phones.

OPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH

Australian expertise in reliable, power and bandwidth efficient satellite communication is contributing to new thinking about this legacy search and rescue system. The intent is to develop a new satellite communications protocols for a third-generation system featuring increased capacity, greater service reliability, two-way connectivity and improved location estimation.

There are opportunities to explore utilisation of emerging Australian technology through existing Cospas-Sarsat infrastructure and extension to new satellite developments and safety of life for space exploration, in partnership with the Australian Space Agency and NASA.

For example, it was recently announced that Australian research into advanced search and rescue technologies would contribute to the NASA Artemis LunaNet architecture .
Future phases of the SmartSat CRC collaboration could support exploration initiatives like the Artemis missions, which will return humans to the Moon for the first time since Apollo. NASA will equip Artemis astronauts with second-generation beacons for use if needed for egress from capsule after splashdown or a launch abort scenario. The Search and Rescue team is working to extend beacon services to the lunar surface with the LunaNet communications and navigation architecture.

Developing a contemporary implementation of a safety of life personal device that can be mass produced at low cost and with high reliability will create scope for Australian industry to lead international production and supply regional countries with personal beacons. Increased capacity in the overall system will enable new applications for emergency services and remote workforce. The ability to integrate contemporary consumer devices could allow Australian developers to generate new business models and identify new markets/customers.

ACTIONS

1. Open discussions with the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) to explore the potential to advocate for the need to develop next generation search and rescue system to support adoption of Australian technology as a standard.

2. Scope and resource R&D project(s) to develop, prototype and demonstrate 3G beacon waveforms and networking protocols.

3. Support the Australian contribution to the NASA Project Artemis and the LunaNet architecture. This could lead to a highly visible Australian contribution to safety of life for all humans involved in lunar and planetary exploration under the Moon to Mars initiative.

4. Explore the potential for Modern Manufacturing Initiative support to develop advanced electronic manufacturing capabilities within Australia targeting satellite consumer devices for a global market

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Earth Observation from space https://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/5-17/ Sun, 09 May 2021 12:01:39 +0000 http://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/?p=18800

Challenge

Virtually all of Australia’s EO capabilities are supplied by other nations or international companies. Australia’s dependence on these satellites, the data they provide and the services that they support is growing rapidly and covers a very broad range of needs, both civilian and defence. Australia has developed a world class satellite imagery analytics and applications capability but has only nascent capability in the upstream supply chain areas of satellite and sensor design, build, launch, task and control. Australia is therefore highly dependent on the rest of the world to provide for its immediate and long-term needs.

OPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH

Australia currently relies on about 20-25 remote sensing satellites for its imagery and sensing needs from space. None of these are Australian owned. With the nascent but growing space start-up industry in Australia now comprising at least 80 companies and the Australia SME sector set for substantial growth there is the opportunity to facilitate a coordinated dual use (civilian – defence) approach to the strategic design and deployment of a constellation of satellites that are built up over the next decade to service the high priority, sovereign needs of Australia.

For example, what is the optimum combination of optical, Near- Infra red (NIR), mid infra-red (MIR) for fire detection and monitoring both now, based on current capabilities, and over the next decade? Continuous monitoring of fires, at operational resolutions, inter-jurisdictionally and nation-wide during catastrophic fire seasons has proven a challenge for Australia. Could this be addressed by a geo-stationary satellite with optical, NIR, MIR and hyperspectral capabilities, with sensor(s) of sufficient ground resolution and signal to noise ratios, coupled with next generation on-board and terrestrial analytics? This is but one of many examples that can be put forward to illustrate the opportunity before Australia of moving from an opportunistic user of the satellites that others choose to launch and operate to a nation of strategic, long term intent.

ACTIONS

1. Australia to investigate the potential for a national approach to the long-term development and deployment of a constellation of satellites, and their supporting systems, to service high priority needs in both the civilian and defence sectors, including examining the role Australia could play at all stages of the space and spatial supply chain. This investigation could usefully be undertaken by a working group drawn from Defence, the Australian Space Agency, CSIRO, Geoscience Australia, SIAA, SIBA-GITA, EOA and SmartSat CRC

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Space as a contested domain https://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/5-15/ Sun, 09 May 2021 12:01:23 +0000 http://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/?p=18798

Challenge

Space is rapidly becoming a contested domain. This raises higher levels of concern that the competition and congestion which largely arises from commercial interests. The US Defense Space Strategy released in June 2020 states “China and Russia have each weaponized space as a means to reduce U.S. and allied military effectiveness and challenge our freedom of operation in space”. This assessment has implications for Australia as a key member of the ‘Five-Eyes’ community and a leading regional security partner of the USA. A recent report from CSIS states “While discussions continue at the United Nations about preventing an arms race in space, the actions of some nations – namely Russia and China – are leading others to prepare for conflict.” In a 2019 speech , the French Minister for the Armed Forces, Ms Florence Parly, stated “If our satellites are threatened, we will consider dazzling those of our opponents. We reserve the time and means of the response: this may involve the use of high-power lasers deployed from our satellites or from our patrol nano-satellites”.

These public comments highlight the growing perception of risk from military actions to space- based assets. Technology developments aimed at reducing strategic advantage gained by use of advanced space systems may impact on non-military space assets. This is especially true given the dual-use nature of many space services and the heavy dependence on commercial systems by defence and national security agencies, including those in Australia.

As has been witnessed with cyber operations, targeting of commercial and civilian space infrastructure is possible from both state and non-state actors and this increasing risk may drive a need for increased investment in hardening critical national infrastructure, including supply chains, where that infrastructure relies on space-based systems. The 2020 Defence Strategic Update refers to increasing risk of “grey-zone” activities, actions contrary to our national interest that fall below recognised thresholds of conflict, with the growing risk of these actions targeting space and cyber-space. What emphasis should be placed on this issue in the RoadMap?

OPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH

There are many adjacent defence industries in electronic warfare and cyber defence that are well positioned to enter the space sector with the required skills, knowledge and clearances to make an impact by developing solution to protection Australian space systems. This will require acquisition of additional skills in space systems and technologies, potentially leading to employment growth.

Growth opportunities are expected for industry in protecting commercial infrastructure in Australia and internationally arising from skills development in response to Critical Infrastructure Protection legislation update.

The application of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Deep Learning and Data Analytics in detecting anomalous behaviours, modelling system resilience and predictive management of complex systems to mitigate “grey-zone” operations in space.

ACTIONS

1. Determine the exposure of Australian critical infrastructure to defence operated space systems such as the US GPS constellation.

2. Continue Australia’s legal and diplomatic efforts (e.g. Project Woomera) to define the application of international law to military uses of space and establish behavioural norms for space operations.

3. Conduct R&D into technologies that can enhance resilience of space services for civilian use at reasonable additional cost.

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Space domain awareness & congestion https://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/5-14/ Sun, 09 May 2021 12:01:16 +0000 http://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/?p=18797

Challenge

Over the last sixty years, humankind has launched thousands of objects into space and in the process has created large amounts of space debris in addition to defunct and operational satellites. The space debris ranges in size from rocket bodies the size of a bus through to hundreds of thousands of objects less than 10 cm in diameter. With orbital velocities exceeding 8 km/second, the kinetic energy in even small objects is sufficient to cause catastrophic damage to satellites. The orbital debris problem exists at all satellite orbits but is exacerbated at low orbits (<1200 km) due to the vastly larger quantities of debris objects at lower orbits. The challenge that this presents is significant as many of the new space projects under development are destined for these low earth orbits. These projects include constellations of thousands of communication satellites, earth observation satellites, academic research projects and remote sensing capabilities.

Currently Australia accesses information on objects in space through military organisations and relies upon the US Department of Defense to compile this data. Australia contributes to this knowledge through a range of sensors located within Australia and is party to a multi-lateral Space Operations Centre organisation that facilitates space domain awareness. With growing commercial interests in space and rising levels of orbital congestion, Australia needs to determine whether this arrangement is suitable for the future and whether additional sensors and data management capabilities within Australia will better assure space domain awareness and our understanding of risks and hazards to our space economy due to events occurring in space (including space weather).

OPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH

By virtue of its geographic span from coast to coast and southern hemisphere location, Australia is uniquely placed to make valuable contributions to global efforts to better characterise objects in space (operational satellites as well as inactive satellites and space debris).

The establishment of a network of ground-based systems including optical (narrow field of view and wide field of view) sensors and radar (active and passive) systems which are tasked by a mission control system would be of real value. The observations would be stored in a unified data lake where they would be available for object characterisation, orbit determination and conjunction analysis.

This Space Domain Awareness (SDA) system would provide situational awareness for Australian space objects, allowing operators to manoeuvre satellites to avoid collisions with other resident space objects such as uncontrolled space debris. The network of sensors could form a dual use system which would meet Australian Defence and civil space requirements (thus addressing Australian space agency goals for SDA). Australia would also be able to contribute observations to international partners to assist with global efforts to improve SDA and contribute to efforts to better manage space debris.

ACTIONS

1. Development of a roadmap for establishment of a network of Australian based sensors for detection and characterisation of objects in space. Capability is to include orbit determination and conjunction analysis to identify objects at potential risk of collision.

2. Establishment of a network of Australian based SDA sensors. The network will be controlled by a mission system and the observations stored in a unified data lake to enable characterisation of objects, determination of orbital parameters and predictions of orbital conjunctions.

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Launch & access to space https://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/5-13/ Sun, 09 May 2021 12:01:09 +0000 http://ssir-consult.cofluence.co/?p=18796

Challenge

Reliable access to space is critical to the growth of the Australian space sector –
without sustainable and cost-effective avenues to launch Australian satellites the Australian space industry will be constrained. Australia needs to ensure that its companies and Government agencies have reliable and timely access to launch capability serving all orbits and launch inclinations to maximise the growth of the Australian space sector and to ensure the ability to maintain critical space-based services.

Historically across the globe launch vehicle manufacture and launch operations were a state controlled or state-funded activity with commercial payloads seeking opportunities from operators primarily serving the government market. Commercial services for non-state satellite operators were constrained by the capability (launch mass and orbital characteristics) and cost effectiveness of launch vehicles designed for government missions and their ability to get on the launch manifest. This is changing with the emergence of privately-owned commercial operators such as SpaceX, RocketLab and Blue Origin developing launch services to serve the commercial market. In spite of this trend towards commercial launch activities (even NASA now uses commercial services for human spaceflight) governments remain the largest purchaser of launch services by number of launches even though commercial satellites now outnumber government satellites due to the proliferation of large commercial satellite constellations (SpaceX has launched 829 operational Starlink satellites between May 2019 and October 2020).

The growth of the commercial launch market has expanded the range of launch operators and new innovations (such as first stage reusability) have reduced the cost to orbit. However, launch remains a potential bottleneck for the Australian satellite industry particularly at the small satellite end of the market (smallsats, cubesats) comprising most current Australian satellite activities.

The improvements achieved by the launch industry do not necessarily scale directly to the small satellite market. Launch is typically the second largest cost in a large satellite program (after the cost of the satellite) but a dedicated launch can exceed the satellite build costs for a small satellite. Cheaper ride-share (shared launches) opportunities are available for small satellites but limit the orbit and the launch timeline to that of the primary payload. Satisfying the Australian regulatory requirements can also be a major issue for ride-share satellites which have little say in the key decisions regarding the launch.

In spite of the growing commercial launch industry the dual-use nature of rocket technology (ability to also be used as weapons) and the importance of space from a national security perspective continues to impact launch availability. In recent years China has emerged as the world leader in number of launches conducted per year yet Australian satellite operators are largely denied access to these launch vehicles due to a US ban on US parts and systems being launched from China. The recent tensions between Russia and Ukraine have effectively removed the highly effective Sea Launch program and Zenit-3 launch vehicle from the market.

The launch market is susceptible to geopolitical forces which can lead to being bumped from a launch manifest to accommodate a military launch to denial of access to certain parts of the launch market. Australia needs to determine whether the current level of reliance on international organisations for launch meets our future needs including our sovereign needs for access to space.

OPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH

The launch market is dynamic with continual efforts to improve access to space with more reliable and cost-effective launch capability. A key target is the small satellite market where a race to develop cost effective access to space is underway including by Australian companies.

Geography is a key factor for launch sites with proximity to the equator and ability to safely launch over open water or unpopulated areas to all launch azimuths from 0 to 98 degrees while minimising overflight of neighbouring countries. Australia is among the few nations that has this capability and is a good location for launch and testing of new vehicles. Australian companies are currently developing launch sites to capitalise on these advantages.

Another emerging opportunity is space tourism and point-to-point travel. Australia is well positioned to become the space tourism hub for Asia and be involved in the development of sub-orbital point-to-point travel, first for fast package delivery and subsequently for human travel around the globe in less than 90 minutes. SpaceX is well advanced with this concept with Australia considered a key initial location and the US military is now evaluating this as means of rapid supply and potentially troop movements globally. No country will benefit more from rapid intercontinental travel than Australia.

Finally, the US plans to return to the Moon, the goal being to harvest and transport space materials as well as the desire to reposition satellites to specific orbits are driving developments of orbital transport systems to move objects to and from LEO to MEO and GEO orbits, beyond GEO, Cis-lunar, Trans-lunar, the Lagrange Points and others. This includes the ability for subsystem recovery/re-use, space vehicle servicing, orbital transfer, orbital debris collection, and replenishment of consumables and expendables on spacecraft that cannot be recovered back to Earth (e.g., spacecraft inspection/servicing, refuelling, hardware maintenance, and technology upgrades) as well as on orbit assembly and sustainment of spacecraft. Australian companies are among many that are actively involved in these developments.

ACTIONS

Access to space is such a critical component for the growth of the Australian space sector that the Australian space community and Australian Government should take active measures to ensure that Australia has reliable access to space.

Actions could include:

2. Ensuring that the licensing regime for launching Australian payloads overseas is as streamlined as possible. The new Rules are an improvement and there is further scope to pre-qualify specific launch sites/launch vehicles which would greatly expedite the licensing process.

3. Ensuring that the licensing regime for domestic launch is no more onerous to Australian launch providers than that faced by their international competitors. The current system requires Australian launch operators to pay for safety analyses that are conducted by the government in other jurisdictions (US, NZ, Japan, China, Russia). These analyses are necessary and similar for both large and small launch vehicles but become a significant fraction of the total cost for small vehicles launching the smaller payloads which is the market entry point for Australian launch providers. These costs represent a significant hurdle for Australian competitors in this competitively priced market.

4. Ensuring that the Australian launch regulatory system is reviewed often to ensure that it is as streamlined as possible (while protecting public safety) and capable of supporting emerging technology. Australia could consider enacting legislation that enables human spaceflight from Australia to position itself to become the space tourism hub for the Asia Pacific and able to be involved in the development of suborbital point-to-point transportation.

5. Supporting the Australian launch providers by purchasing Australian rather than overseas launches wherever practicable. Historically national government support as a major customer/ supporter has been a key factor in the success of most commercial launch suppliers.

6. Undertaking a detailed review of the importance and criticality of sovereign space launch capability. Is Australia’s current reliance on the commercial launch market to supply its access to space sufficiently robust to ensure that Australia can launch its national security, weather & environmental monitoring, positioning and commercial satellites when it needs to? Can Australia withstand potential disruptions to the commercial launch market from geopolitical events (including bans on launching from certain countries), launch vehicle stand-down due to failure, supply chain disruptions and delays (including from pandemic health issues) and market saturation which prevents timely placement on a launch manifest?

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