Australia and space

Australia’s space sovereignty

Delivery of space-enabled services depends on reliable and continued access to satellite systems and their data streams. With some minor exceptions Australia does not have a history of ownership of satellites and systems.
Instead, the national focus has been on exploitation of the systems of other nations or organisations through a globally well-regarded approach to collaboration.

Characterised by a multi-source approach, Australia has developed applications that integrate different types of data from different suppliers and partners with the benefit that:

• the applications are richer (e.g. by exploiting the strengths of different systems in a complementary manner, or using multiple systems to provide additional data to increase spatial and temporal coverage); and
• Australia is more insulated from technical failures (e.g. instrument failure) or sudden changes in the policy environment (e.g. sudden changes to data policy).

Australia is likely to continue to build on this approach to enable the delivery of better products to users and consumers locally, and globally. Moreover, Australia’s openness to using what is available is not just of interest to Australia, but also to the approximately 170 or so other nations who would prefer not to be dependent on data controlled by a single major supplier. Continued encouragement of the multi-source approach positions Australia well to export space-enabled services.

However, Australia must also consider how to better manage the risks associated with dependence on other nations and foreign companies. Continued and increased investment in ground segment partnerships will continue to be a key part of generating goodwill. Australia is keen to continue to encourage global coordination of satellite systems, the use of standards and ‘open public data’. This approach has given Australia access to a richer diversity of data types than would be available under an uncoordinated approach with every nation focussed only on unilateral outcomes.

Australia’s space industry could, however, play an important role in developing niche capabilities and systems that address key risks and opportunities. This capability should be developed, and then leveraged, to address scenarios where Australia:

• has something of value to contribute to the space segment of critical partner programs (in return for assurance of future data supply).
• has unique local or regional needs, that are highly unlikely to be met internationally.
• can support users to strengthen the ‘multi-source’ approach, for example by providing cross-calibration of foreign missions.
• can make contributions to the global observing system, and thereby encourage ongoing coordination and data sharing by others.
• can identify risks where sovereign access or control can reduce our exposure to an acceptable level.
• can obtain timely access to data, as one component of assurance, that contributes to high priority national needs

Developing and nurturing our nascent space industry’s capabilities to meet these needs in any operational (as opposed to experimental) sense will take time. It will need support and encouragement from government, including to ensure our industry has the necessary maturity and technical readiness. Australia has highly trained people, and many innovative businesses.

However, many of the satellite systems Australia relies upon for the data that underpins spatial services are highly sophisticated with a proven record for operational reliability.

Although changes in satellite technology do lower barriers and create new opportunities, a clear-eyed approach, responding to requirements and drivers in the market, will be needed when considering the development of national missions.

Defining Australian Space and Spatial Sovereignty

There has been increasing use of the term sovereignty and concern about supply chain vulnerability in relation to the space sector by Government in recent times. Major legislative and policy announcements such as the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) bill, the Modern Manufacturing initiative and the Defence Strategic Update all make reference to a need for sovereignty and reduced reliance on global supply chains for critical infrastructure, systems and technology including space.

It would be useful to derive an agreed definition of ‘sovereignty and the national need’ in the context of access to Australian space and spatial services.

A working definition of sovereignty and the national interest would address the required degree to which Australia is capable of determining and prosecuting actions deemed by Government to be in our national interest; free of interference, coercion or limits imposed by other nations.

This might include access to, and the operation of, the space systems themselves, or to intellectual property allowing effective operation of the system in question.

Sovereignty and the national need might be implied to infer requirements for ownership and /or control from Australian legal entities or from within Australian geography. Within the space and spatial sector, this could extend to the industrial capability that supplies goods and services and ownership/control of supply chains upon which acquisition, operation and sustainment of all components of the enterprise depend, and the skillsets and capability in the workforce, the research sector and the public service.

Interference, coercion and limits might result in constraints on what space services Australia can access. It may also be observed as degradation of available services if Australia’s interests do not align with the interest of the supplying organisation or their host nation.

For example, an imagery provider may not support request for data over certain geographic areas or a government operator of a GNSS system may degrade or turn off a timing signal for a certain time or over a certain geographic area. A communications service provider may not, or may not be able to, provide coverage or limit available RF bandwidth at certain times or over certain locations.

The following diagram shows how procurement strategies might recognise when such controls could hinder our freedom of action and drive the need for national self-reliance or sovereignty.